Brazil 1994: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
New page: '''Score = ''' ''Governed by:'' Law #8884 of June 11 1994<ref>Global Competition Forum website, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%... |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
'''Score = ''' | '''Score = 19''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Law #8884 of June 11 1994<ref>Global Competition Forum website, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF; http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/brazilian-antitrust-law.pdf</ref> | ''Governed by:'' Law #8884 of June 11 1994<ref>Global Competition Forum website, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF; http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/brazilian-antitrust-law.pdf</ref>(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
Revision as of 23:42, 28 December 2007
Score = 19
Governed by: Law #8884 of June 11 1994[1](hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 says that the Act applies to anything that has an effect within Brazil. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 23-27 imposes fines for certain violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Articles 29 and 30 provides a cause of action and possible remedies for injured 3rd parties. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 29 provides a cause of action and possible remedies for injured 3rd parties. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | The 1994 Act does not explicitly require notification of mergers. Article 54(4) was made an explicit requirement as to mergers only in the 2000 amendments. |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 54(3) defines a dominant position post-merger as a firm holding more than 20% of relevant market share. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 54 prohibits merger agreements that restrict competition.
| |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 54(I)(c) allows an exception to the prohibition if the agreement increases efficiency. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 21(VI) prohibits limiting access of competitors to input, material, or equipment. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 20(IV) prohibits the abuse of one’s market control. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 21(I) prohibits price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 21(XII) prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Article 21(XI) prohibits RPM. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 21(IV) prohibits limiting market access by new companies. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 21(I) prohibits price fixing. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 21(XXIII) prohibits tying arrangements. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 21(III) prohibits market apportionment. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 21(X) prohibits limiting production and development. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 21(V) prohibits posing difficulties for the development of a competitor company. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 21(VIII) prohibits bid-rigging for public contracts. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 21(XIII) prohibits supply refusal. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 |