France, 2005: Difference between revisions

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| Efficiency
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| Article L.430-6 allows consideration of
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| Price Setting
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| Article 8 applies the restriction on price setting as established in Article 7 to dominant companies.
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| Article 8 bans discriminatory pricing by dominant companies.
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| Resale Price Maintenance
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| Article 32 bans RPM when the distributor sets a minimum price (but not for setting a max price)
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| Article 10(2) offers a defense for showing that the effect of the acts if they ensure economic progress.
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| Article 7(2) prohibits price fixing.
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| Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply.
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| Article 7(1) prohibits agreements that limits access to the market or free exercise of competition by other enterprises.
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| Article 10 exempts for Article 7 and 8 agreements that have the effect of ensuring economic progress.
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Revision as of 20:07, 24 June 2008

Some French competition law is codified in provisions of the code de la consommation (consumer code).[1] The majority is contained in Livre (book) IV of the Code de commerce (commercial code).[2][3][4] Unless otherwise specified, all provisions cited refer to the Code de commerce.

Score = 24

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article L.420-1 extends the scope of the act outside of France in limited circumstances.
Remedies Fines 1 Article L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger.
Prison Sentences 1 Article L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute.
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Article L.440-1 allows third parties to initiate proceedings.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge.
Pre-merger 2 Article L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances.
Post-merger
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of public public interest, especially with regard to international competitors, when deciding whether to permit a merger.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access
Abusive Acts
Price Setting
Discriminatory Pricing
Resale Price Maintenance
Obstacles to Entry
Efficiency Defense
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing
Tying
Market Division
Output Restraint
Market Sharing
Eliminating Competitors
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
Supply Refusal
Efficiency Defense

References

  1. ↑ Available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20080624
  2. ↑ most recent version of the commercial code available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?dateTexte=20080624&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&fastReqId=239729146&fastPos=6&oldAction=rechCodeArticle
  3. ↑ Limited English version available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3094
  4. ↑ The French Commercial Code in English 2005, Philip Raworth translator, 2005, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, Inc.


References

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