Italy (October 10, 1990): Difference between revisions
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| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Chapter | | Chapter III, Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Authority. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 30: | Line 30: | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Chapter | | Chapter III, Section 18(3) permits the Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 60: | Line 60: | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| Chapter | | Chapter III, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 114: | Line 114: | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access. | | Title I, Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 120: | Line 120: | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it. | | Title I, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 126: | Line 126: | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 132: | Line 132: | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 138: | Line 138: | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 144: | Line 144: | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 156: | Line 156: | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 174: | Line 174: | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint. | | Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint. | ||
|- | |- | ||
Revision as of 16:34, 28 June 2008
Score =
Governed by: Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Title IV, Section 25(2) implies that scope extends to foreign corporations. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Chapter III, Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Authority. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Chapter III, Section 18(3) permits the Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Authority. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | |||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | |||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | ||
| Mandatory | 3 | Chapter III, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation. | |
| Pre-merger | |||
| Post-merger | |||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | ||
| Restriction of Competition | |||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | |||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | |||
| Other | |||
| Efficiency | |||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Title I, Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Title I, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access. | |
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. |
| Tying | |||
| Market Division | |||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | |||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | |||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| Efficiency Defense |