Italy (October 10, 1990): Difference between revisions

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| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title IV, Section 25(2) implies that scope extends to foreign corporations.
| Section 25(2) implies that scope extends to foreign corporations.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Competition Authority.
| Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Competition Authority.


|-
|-
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| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.
| Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter II, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.  
| Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.  


|-
|-
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| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
| Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
|-
|-
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| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 2
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
| Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
|-
|-
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Market dominance is considered before mergers are approved.  If a merger will result in market dominance, it may not be approved, or the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.<ref>Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Chapter I, Section 6</ref>
| Market dominance is considered before mergers are approved.  If a merger will result in market dominance, it may not be approved, or the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.<ref>Section 6</ref>
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Chapter I, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
| Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
|-
|-
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| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Chapter I, Section 8(2) states that undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly, are exempt from the anti-competition measures of this law, but only if that is necessary for the provision of those services.
| Section 8(2) states that undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly, are exempt from the anti-competition measures of this law, but only if that is necessary for the provision of those services.
|-
|-
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| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| 1
| Undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly must still submit notification to, and receive approval from, the Competition Authority before any merger.<ref> Undertakings that are exempt from anti-competition measures which provide services to their subsidiaries or controlled companies must provide the same terms and other conditions to competitors.<ref> When exemption from anti-competition measures is done for purposes of public order, public safety, national defense, or telecommunications, businesses may not be able to produce their own services internally except if a government franchise is granted.<ref>Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Chapter I, Section 9(2)</ref>
| Undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly must still submit notification to, and receive approval from, the Competition Authority before any merger.<ref> Undertakings that are exempt from anti-competition measures which provide services to their subsidiaries or controlled companies must provide the same terms and other conditions to competitors.<ref> When exemption from anti-competition measures is done for purposes of public order, public safety, national defense, or telecommunications, businesses may not be able to produce their own services internally except if a government franchise is granted.<ref>Section 9(2)</ref>
|-
|-
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| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access.
| Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.
| Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.


|-
|-
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| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting.
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting.


|-
|-
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| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
| Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
|-
|-
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| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
|-
|-
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| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access.
| Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access.
|-
|-
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| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
| Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
|-
|-
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| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint.
| Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint.
|-
|-
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| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 0
| 0
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Chapter I, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically.  The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
| Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically.  The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
|-
|-

Revision as of 03:16, 7 July 2008

Score = __

Governed by:

Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of 13 October 1990).[1]


Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Section 25(2) implies that scope extends to foreign corporations.
Remedies Fines 1 Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Competition Authority.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary
Mandatory 3 Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
Pre-merger 2 Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
Post-merger
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. If a merger will result in market dominance, it may not be approved, or the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.[2]
Restriction of Competition 1 Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Section 8(2) states that undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly, are exempt from the anti-competition measures of this law, but only if that is necessary for the provision of those services.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 1 Undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly must still submit notification to, and receive approval from, the Competition Authority before any merger.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access.
Abusive Acts 1 Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.
Price Setting 1 Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
Obstacles to Entry 1 Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access.
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
Tying 0
Market Division 0
Output Restraint 1 Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint.
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 0 Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically. The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 0

References