France, 1986: Difference between revisions
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1986 saw the passage of a major competition law, Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986.<ref>The text of the statute is available in ''French Law, Constitution and Selective Legislation,'' George A. Bermann & Vivian G. Curran, 1998, section 5 (last updated, 1994). The edition notes the legislative changes | 1986 saw the passage of a major competition law, Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986.<ref>The text of the statute is available in ''French Law, Constitution and Selective Legislation,'' George A. Bermann & Vivian G. Curran, 1998, section 5 (last updated, 1994). The edition notes the legislative changes from the original 1986 statute.</ref> This replaced Ordinnance No. 45-1243 of June 30, 1945 and its modifications, as well as Law No. 77-806 of 19 July 1977 (the old Merger Reg). 1986 also saw the repeal of Penal Code Art. 419 (after 176 years!)<ref>in Provision 57 of the statute</ref>. | ||
''Governed by:'' Ordinance no. 86-1243 of 1 December 1986. | ''Governed by:'' Ordinance no. 86-1243 of 1 December 1986.<ref>the full French text of the 1986 statute is available from Legifrance, starting at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19861209&pageDebut=14773&pageFin=&pageCourante=14773</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| Scope | | Scope | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | Extraterritoriality | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
| Remedies | | Remedies | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 13 and 17 provide for fines for competition violations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 17 provides for prison sentences for key players in fraudulent competition violations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 42 of the statute provides for divestitures of anticompetitive mergers. | ||
| Line 37: | Line 37: | ||
| Private Enforcement | | Private Enforcement | ||
| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 11 allows some third parties to initiate investigations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 36 establishes tort liability in limited circumstances, including discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | | 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Merger Notification | | Merger Notification | ||
| | |Voluntary | ||
| | | 2 | ||
| | | Art. 38 states that merging companies may notify the government of the merger. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 67: | Line 67: | ||
| | | | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 73: | Line 73: | ||
| | | | ||
| Post-merger | | Post-merger | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 38 says that the government may be notified of a merger up to 3 months after the merger. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 38 states that one criteria for merger notification is creation of a dominant position. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 38 states that restriction of competition is a factor in merger consideration. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 40 allows for economic progress from the merger to count in the merging companies' favor. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 103: | Line 103: | ||
| | | | ||
| Other | | Other | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 41 allows for consideration of "the competitiveness of the enterprises concerned from the standpoint of international competition" in merger consideration. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 111: | Line 111: | ||
| 0 | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | Limits access | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 121: | Line 122: | ||
| | | | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 8 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 8 incorporates part of Art. 7, which prohibits price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 8 prohibits discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 34 bans resale price maintenance. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 151: | Line 152: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 10.2 allows a limited efficiency defense. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 7 bans price fixing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 8 bans tying. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 7 bans market division. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 7.3 bans output restraint. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 187: | Line 188: | ||
| | | | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 7 prohibits agreements which impede competition. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 199: | Line 200: | ||
| | | | ||
| Supply Refusal | | Supply Refusal | ||
| | |1 | ||
| | | Art. 8 prohibits supply refusal by cartels. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 10.2 provides for a limited efficiency defense. | ||
|} | |} | ||
Revision as of 16:22, 10 July 2008
Score = 20
1986 saw the passage of a major competition law, Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986.[1] This replaced Ordinnance No. 45-1243 of June 30, 1945 and its modifications, as well as Law No. 77-806 of 19 July 1977 (the old Merger Reg). 1986 also saw the repeal of Penal Code Art. 419 (after 176 years!)[2].
Governed by: Ordinance no. 86-1243 of 1 December 1986.[3]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 13 and 17 provide for fines for competition violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Article 17 provides for prison sentences for key players in fraudulent competition violations. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | Art. 42 of the statute provides for divestitures of anticompetitive mergers.
| |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 11 allows some third parties to initiate investigations. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 36 establishes tort liability in limited circumstances, including discriminatory pricing. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 2 | Art. 38 states that merging companies may notify the government of the merger. |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 1 | Article 38 says that the government may be notified of a merger up to 3 months after the merger. | |
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Art. 38 states that one criteria for merger notification is creation of a dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Art. 38 states that restriction of competition is a factor in merger consideration. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Art. 40 allows for economic progress from the merger to count in the merging companies' favor. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | Art. 41 allows for consideration of "the competitiveness of the enterprises concerned from the standpoint of international competition" in merger consideration. | |
| Efficiency | 0 |
| |
| Dominance | Limits access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Art. 8 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 8 incorporates part of Art. 7, which prohibits price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Art. 8 prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Art. 34 bans resale price maintenance. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Art. 10.2 allows a limited efficiency defense. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Art. 7 bans price fixing. |
| Tying | 1 | Art. 8 bans tying. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Art. 7 bans market division. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Art. 7.3 bans output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Art. 7 prohibits agreements which impede competition. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Art. 8 prohibits supply refusal by cartels.
| |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Art. 10.2 provides for a limited efficiency defense. |
References
- ↑ The text of the statute is available in French Law, Constitution and Selective Legislation, George A. Bermann & Vivian G. Curran, 1998, section 5 (last updated, 1994). The edition notes the legislative changes from the original 1986 statute.
- ↑ in Provision 57 of the statute
- ↑ the full French text of the 1986 statute is available from Legifrance, starting at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19861209&pageDebut=14773&pageFin=&pageCourante=14773