Syria, 2008: Difference between revisions
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New page: '''This page is under construction. Please check back in late July, 2008.''' '''Score = ''' ''Governed by:'' {| class="wikitable" |- ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment |- cl... |
Coded 2008. |
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'''Score = 23''' | |||
'''Score = ''' | |||
''Governed by:'' | ''Governed by: Law on Competition and the Prevention of Monopoly (Law 7 of 2008)<ref>law available in Arabic from the ''Carnegie Endowment for International Peace'' and ''The Syria Report,'' at http://www.syria-report.com/doc/Competition_and_Anti-Trust_Law.pdf - Google translate was used to translate the statute into English.</ref> ("the statute")'' | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| Line 11: | Line 10: | ||
| Scope | | Scope | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | Extraterritoriality | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 3(D) of the statute states that it applies to extraterritorial activities which affect the Syrian market. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Remedies | | Remedies | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| | |1 | ||
| | | Articles 23(A) and (B) provide for fines. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 29: | Line 28: | ||
| | | | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 14(A)(3) provides for divestitures of certain mergers. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Private Enforcement | | Private Enforcement | ||
| | |Third Party Initiation | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | |Article 17 permits consumers and Chambers of Commerce to ask the council to investigate violations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. 26 affords injured third parties a civil action. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | | 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 10D says that interested third parties may submit writings to the Ministers on proposed mergers. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Merger Notification | | Merger Notification | ||
| Voluntary | | Voluntary | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 59: | Line 58: | ||
| | | | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| | | 3 | ||
| | | Article 9(B) provides for mandatory, pre-merger notification for certain mergers. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| | | 2 | ||
| | | Article 9(B) provides for mandatory, pre-merger notification for certain mergers. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Post-merger | | Post-merger | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 77: | Line 76: | ||
| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 9(A) and (B) state that strengthening a dominant position is a factor in merger analysis | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 9(A) and (B) state that the effects on competition are considerations in merger analysis | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 14(A)(1) states that a merger may be allowed if there are public interest justifications for it. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | | Public Interest (Pro Authority) | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 101: | Line 100: | ||
| | | | ||
| Other | | Other | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 107: | Line 106: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 14(A)(1) states that a efficiency considerations may play a role in deciding to grant a merger. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 119: | Line 118: | ||
| | | | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6 bans abuse of a dominant position | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| | |1 | ||
| | |Article 6(A) bans price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | |Articles 6(C) and 8(A)(2) ban discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 6(B) and 8(A)(1) ban resale price maintenance. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6 bans the creation of obstacles to entry | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 7(B) allows for otherwise prohibited practices if they contribute to efficiency. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(1) bans price fixing | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| | |0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 167: | Line 167: | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(3) bans market division. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(4) bans output restraint. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Sharing | | Market Sharing | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 185: | Line 185: | ||
| | | | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(5) and 5(7) disallow eliminating competitors | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(2) bans bid-rigging. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Supply Refusal | | Supply Refusal | ||
| | |1 | ||
| | | Article 5(6) bans agreements refusing to supply. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(c) provides for an efficiency defense of otherwise prohibited practices. . | ||
|} | |} | ||
Revision as of 19:11, 17 July 2008
Score = 23
Governed by: Law on Competition and the Prevention of Monopoly (Law 7 of 2008)[1] ("the statute")
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3(D) of the statute states that it applies to extraterritorial activities which affect the Syrian market. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 23(A) and (B) provide for fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 14(A)(3) provides for divestitures of certain mergers. | |
| Private Enforcement | Third Party Initiation | 1 | Article 17 permits consumers and Chambers of Commerce to ask the council to investigate violations. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Art. 26 affords injured third parties a civil action. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 10D says that interested third parties may submit writings to the Ministers on proposed mergers. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 9(B) provides for mandatory, pre-merger notification for certain mergers. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 9(B) provides for mandatory, pre-merger notification for certain mergers. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Articles 9(A) and (B) state that strengthening a dominant position is a factor in merger analysis |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Articles 9(A) and (B) state that the effects on competition are considerations in merger analysis | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 14(A)(1) states that a merger may be allowed if there are public interest justifications for it. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 14(A)(1) states that a efficiency considerations may play a role in deciding to grant a merger. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 6 bans abuse of a dominant position | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 6(A) bans price setting.
| |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Articles 6(C) and 8(A)(2) ban discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Articles 6(B) and 8(A)(1) ban resale price maintenance. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 6 bans the creation of obstacles to entry | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 7(B) allows for otherwise prohibited practices if they contribute to efficiency. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 5(1) bans price fixing |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | Article 5(3) bans market division. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 5(4) bans output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 5(5) and 5(7) disallow eliminating competitors | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 5(2) bans bid-rigging. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 5(6) bans agreements refusing to supply. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 5(c) provides for an efficiency defense of otherwise prohibited practices. . |
References
- ↑ law available in Arabic from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Syria Report, at http://www.syria-report.com/doc/Competition_and_Anti-Trust_Law.pdf - Google translate was used to translate the statute into English.