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| [[Belarus_December_2002]]
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| '''RTP - Efficiency Defense.'''
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| ''I think the following counts as an efficiency defense to RTP.''
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| 6(3) - "3. In exceptional cases, agreements (coordinated actions) between economic entities as stipulated by the present Article, excluding those listed in clause 1 of the present Article, may be considered legally valid by anti-monopoly body in compliance with the procedure sets up by the President of the Republic of Belarus, or by any other state body or court authorized by the President, provided the economic entities prove that economic effect of their actions, including social and economic sectors, will exceed negative consequences for the given commodity market or the Republic of Belarus as a whole, and competition must only be restricted to the extent wherein the above restrictions are inevitable for the achievement of the given economic effect, or directly stipulated by legislative acts adopted (issued) in according with the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus."
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 10:38, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| I agree, looks like an efficiency defense.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 11:04, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| ----
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| [[Bulgaria 2003]]
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|
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| '''Merger Efficiency Defense'''
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|
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| ''Looks like a merger efficiency defense to me (see 28(2))''
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| Authorisation for Concentration
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| Article 28. (1) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission shall authorise the concentration provided that the latter does not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position that would significantly impede effective competition on the market concerned.
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| (2) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission may authorise a concentration which, although creating or strengthening a dominant position, aims at modernisation of production or of the economy as a whole, improvement of the market structures, attraction of investments, creation of new jobs, better satisfying of the interests of the consumers, and as a whole outweighs the negative impact on competition on the market concerned.
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| (3) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission may include in the authorisation referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) additional restrictive requirements which are directly related to the implementation of the concentration and are needed for the preservation of the effective competition or the overall positive impact on the market concerned.
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|
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 11:08, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Definitely looks like an efficiency defense.
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|
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 18:06, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| ----
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| [[Bolivia 1994]]
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| '''Constitution'''
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| ''Can't translate the full document''
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| http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/consboliv2005.html
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| ----
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| [[Brazil 2000]]
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| '''Remedies/Fines'''
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| ''Looks like Articles 23 to 27 discuss various fines''
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| CHAPTER III
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| PENALTIES
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| Article 23. The following antitrust penalties shall apply:
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| I - for companies: a fine from one to thirty percent of the gross pretax revenue thereof as of the latest financial year,
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| which fine shall by no means be lower than the advantage obtained from the underlying violation, if assessable;
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| II - for managers directly or indirectly liable to their company's violation: a fine from ten to fifty percent of the fine
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| imposed on said company, which shall be personally and exclusively imposed on the manager; and
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| III - in the case of other individuals and other public or private legal entities, as well as any de facto or de jure
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| associations of entities or persons, even temporary ones, with or without legal identity, that do not engage in
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| business activities, when it is not feasible to use the gross sales value, the fine will be 6,000 (six thousand) to
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| 6,000,000 (six million) UFIR or any other index replacing it.
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| Sole Paragraph. Fines imposed on recurring violations shall be doubled.
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| Article 24. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article, the fines listed below may be individually or
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| cumulatively imposed on violations, whenever the severity of the facts or the public interest so requires:
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| I - at the violator's expense, half-page publication of the summary sentence in a court-appointed newspaper for two
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| consecutive days, from one to three consecutive weeks;
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| II. - ineligibility for official financing or participation in bidding processes involving purchases, sales, works,
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| services or utility concessions with the federal, state, municipal and the Federal District authorities and related
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| entities, for a period equal to or exceeding five years;
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| III. - annotation of the violator on the Brazilian Consumer Protection List;
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| IV - recommendation that the proper public agencies:
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| (a) grant compulsory licenses for patents held by the violator; and
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| (b) deny the violator installment payment of federal overdue debts, or order total or partial cancellation of tax
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| incentives or public subsidies;
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| V - the company's spin-off, transfer of corporate control, sale of assets, partial discontinuance of activities, or any
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| other antitrust measure required for such purposes.
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| Article 25. If any acts or situations detrimental to the economic order are not discontinued after a CADE Board decision to
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| this effect, or in the event preventive measures or any cease-and-desist commitment set forth herein are not complied with, a
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| daily fine equal to or higher than 5,000 (five thousand) Fiscal Reference Units — UFIR or replacing index shall apply, which
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| fine may be increased as many as twenty times in accordance with the severity of the violation and the violator's economic
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| status.
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| Article 26. In the event any data or documents requested by CADE, SDE, SEAE or other public entity acting under this Law
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| are unreasonably denied, concealed, tampered with or delayed, this shall constitute a violation subject to a daily fine of 5,000
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| (five thousand) UFIR, which fine may be increased up to twentyfold in keeping with the violator's economic status.
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| Article 27. The penalties provided for in this Law shall apply with due regard for:
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| I - the severity of the violation;
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| II - the violator's good faith;
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| III - the advantages obtained or envisaged by the violator;
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| IV - actual or threatened occurrence of the violation;
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| V - the extent of damages or threatened damages to open competition, the Brazilian economy, consumers, or third
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| parties;
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| VI - the adverse economic effects on the market;
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| VII - the violator's economic status;
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| VIII - recurrences.
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| Agreed, this describes fines.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 18:14, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| ----
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| [[Brazil 2000]]
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| '''Private Enforcement - 3rd Party Initiation'''
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| ''Article 30 also allows private parties to petition admin body to initiate proceedings.''
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| TITLE VI
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| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
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| CHAPTER I
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| PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
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| Article 30. SDE may carry out preliminary investigations ex officio or at the written and reasonable request of interested
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| parties; no disclosure as to any such investigations shall be made whenever the evidence as to purported violation of the
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| economic order does not suffice to immediate commencement of administrative proceedings.
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| Paragraph 1. During preliminary investigations, the SDE Secretary may adopt any of the steps set forth in article 35 hereof,
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| including requests for clarification addressed to the defendant.
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| Paragraph 2. Commencement of administrative proceedings out of formal complaints addressed by the Senate or the House
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| of Representatives is not conditioned to preliminary investigations.
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|
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| Agreed.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 18:14, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| ----
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|
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| [[Brazil 2000]]
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| '''RTP - bid-rigging'''
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|
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| ''Have a look at Article 21(VIII)''
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| Article 21. The acts spelled out below, among others, will be deemed a violation of the economic order, to the extent
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| applicable under article 20 and items thereof:
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| I - to set or offer in any way — in collusion with competitors — prices and conditions for the sale of a certain
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| product or service;
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| II - to obtain or otherwise procure the adoption of uniform or concerted business practices among competitors;
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| III - to apportion markets for finished or semi-finished products or services, or for supply sources of raw materials
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| or intermediary products;
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| IV - to limit or restrain market access by new companies;
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| V - to pose difficulties for the establishment, operation or development of a competitor company or supplier,
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| purchaser or financier of a certain product or service;
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| VI - to bar access of competitors to input, raw material, equipment or technology sources, as well as to their
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| distribution channels;
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| VII - to require or grant exclusivity in mass media advertisements;
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| VIII - to agree in advance on prices or advantages in public or administrative biddings;
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| IX - to affect third-party prices by deceitful means;
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| X - to regulate markets of a certain product or service by way of agreements devised to limit or control
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| technological research and development, the production of products or services, or to dampen investments for the
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| production of products and services or distribution thereof;
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| XI - to impose on distributors, retailers and representatives of a certain product or service retail prices, discounts,
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| payment conditions, minimum or maximum volumes, profit margins, or any other marketing conditions related to
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| their business with third parties;
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| XII - to discriminate against purchasers or suppliers of a certain product or service by establishing price differentials
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| or discriminatory operating conditions for the sale or performance of services;
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| XIII - to deny the sale of a certain product or service within the payment conditions usually applying to regular
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| business practices and policies;
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| XIV - to hamper the development of or terminate business relations for an indeterminate period, in view of the
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| terminated party's refusal to comply with unreasonable or non-competitive clauses or business conditions;
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| XV - to destroy, render unfit for use or take possession of raw materials, intermediary or finished products, as well
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| as destroy, render unfit for use or constrain the operation of any equipment intended to manufacture, distribute or
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| transport them;
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| XVI - to take possession of or bar the use of industrial or intellectual property rights or technology;
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| XVII - to abandon of cause abandonment or destruction of crops or harvests, without provenly good cause;
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| XVIII - to unreasonably sell products below cost;
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| XIX - to import any assets below cost from an exporting country other than those signatories of the GATT
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| Antidumping and Subsidies Codes;
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| XX - to discontinue or greatly reduce production, without provenly good cause;
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| XXI - to partially or fully discontinue the company's activities, without provenly good cause;
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| XXII - to retain production or consumer goods, except for ensuring recovery of production costs;
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| XXIII - to condition the sale of a product to acquisition of another or contracting of a service, or to condition
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| performance of a service to contracting of another or purchase of a product;
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| XXIV - to impose abusive prices, or unreasonably increase the price of a product or service.
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| Sole Paragraph. For the purpose of characterizing an imposition of abusive prices or unreasonable increase of prices, the
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| following items shall be considered, with due regard for other relevant economic or market circumstances:
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| I - the price of a product or service, or any increase therein, vis-à-vis any changes in the cost of their respective input
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| or with quality improvements;
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| II - the price of a product previously manufactured, as compared to its market replacement without substantial
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| changes;
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| III - the price for a similar product or service, or any improvement thereof, on like competitive markets; and
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| IV - the existence of agreements or arrangements in any way, which cause an increase in the prices of a product or
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| service, or in their respective costs.
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|
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| This sounds different from bid-rigging to me. While this does discuss bidding, I don't think it's specifically referring to agreeing not to bid at market price so the stock will go down. You should probably ask Hytlon though.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 18:14, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Hylton: Code this as a 1 for bid-rigging.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 10:26, 25 June 2007 (EDT)
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|
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| ----
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|
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| [[Brazil 2000]]
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|
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| '''Merger Assessment - Dominance'''
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|
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| ''Article 54(3)? Does the discussion of holding more than 20% of market share imply dominance?''
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|
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| TITLE VII.
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| MONITORING MECHANISMS
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| CHAPTER I.
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| MONITORING OF ACTS AND AGREEMENTS
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| Article 54. Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in the control of relevant markets for
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| certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE for review.
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| Paragraph 1. CADE may authorize any acts referred to in the main section of this article, provided that they meet the
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| following requirements:
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| I - they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to:
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| (a) increase productivity;
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| (b) improve the quality of a product or service; or
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| (c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic development;
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| II - the resulting benefits shall be ratably allocated among their participants, on the one part, and consumers or endusers,
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| on the other;
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| III - they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a product or service; and
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| IV - only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for that purpose.
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| Paragraph 2. Any action under this article may be considered lawful if at least three of the requirements listed in the above
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| items are met, whenever any such action is taken in the public interest or otherwise required to the benefit of the Brazilian
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| economy, provided no damages are caused end-consumers or users.
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| Paragraph 3. The acts dealt with in the main section of this article also include any action intended for any form of economic
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| concentration, whether through merger with or into other companies, organization of companies to control third companies or
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| any other form of corporate grouping, when the resulting company or group of companies accounts for twenty percent (20%)
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| of a relevant market, or in which any of the participants has posted in its latest balance sheets an annual gross revenue
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| equivalent to R$ 400,000,000 (four hundred million of Reais).
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|
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| I don't think the 20% requirement is sufficient to imply dominance. Did we discuss this with Hytlon earlier? It may have been at Friday meeting with Kaj, so you may want to ask him.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 18:14, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Hylton: This is dominance
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 10:26, 25 June 2007 (EDT)
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