Austria: Difference between revisions

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Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as "Cartel Act").<ref>Austrian Competition Act, ''Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland'', 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).</ref>
Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as "Cartel Act").<ref>Austrian Competition Act, ''Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland'', 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable" border="1 "
|-
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment
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|


|-
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd party initiation
| 1
| A 3rd party can bring a claim against anything that is based on § 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG)
|-
|
| Remedies available to 3rd parties
| 1
| A 3rd party can assert civil claims IF they have suffered a damage caused by a punishable act.
|-
|
| 3rd party rights in proceedings
| 0
| 3rd parties are not entitled to request a 2nd phase investigation or challenge decisions of the court and have no access to evidence.
|-
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|
|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| § 42a(1) says if the companies made a certain combined income in the previous year, they must apply to the cartel court.
|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 0
|
|-
|
| Post-merger
| 1
| §42a(5) says that the Cartel Court shall determine whether the concentration WAS implemented in a prohibited manner (sounds like post…)
|-
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| §42b(2)(2) The Cartel Court shall prohibit the concentration if it will strengthen the market dominating position.
|-
|
| Restriction of competition
| 0
|
|-
|
| Public interest (ProD)
| 1
| The effect on the national economy and public interest is investigated when deciding whether to grant an exception (see §42b(3)).
|-
|
| Public Interest (ProAuthority)
| 0
|
|-
|
| Other
| 0
|
|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|
|-
| Dominance
| Limits access
| 1
| § 35(1)(2) prohibits the restriction of production, sales, or development to the detriment of the consumer.
|-
|
| Abusive acts
| 1
| § 35(1) lists several punishable abusive acts.
|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| § 35(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of unreasonable prices.
|-
|
| Discriminatory pricing
| 1
| § 35(1)(3) identifies as abuse the placing of contractual partners at a competitive disadvantage by applying different terms for the provision of equivalent services.
|-
|
| Resale price maintenance
| 0
|
|-
|
| Obstacles to entry
| 0
|
|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|
|-
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price fixing
| 1
| § 10(3) identifying a restraint of competition with respect to prices (not per se illegal)
|-
|
| Tying
| 0
|
|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| § 23(1) per se prohibits arrangements under which the parties agree that they shall only market certain products.
|-
|
| Output restraint
| 1
| § 23 (1)(b) does not cartels that require companies to sell products in specifically restricted quantities.
|-
|
| Market sharing
| 0
|
|-
|
| Eliminating competitors
| 1
| Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1).
|-
|
| Collusive tendering/bid-rigging
| 0
|
|-
|
| Supply refusal
| 1
| § 30 prohibits supply boycotts when they cause damage. Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1)(c).
|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| §23(3) allows cartels when they are justified with respect to the national economy.
|}
|}


== References ==
<references />
<references />

Revision as of 13:01, 19 June 2007

Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as "Cartel Act").[1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 § 6(1) of the Cartel Act applies to behavior in a foreign country in so far as it affects the domestic market.
Remedies Fines 1 § 129-133 provide for violations of the Cartel Act to be sanctioned with fines.
Prison sentences 1 § 129(1) also provides for imprisonment for up to 3 years in certain cases.
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd party initiation 1 A 3rd party can bring a claim against anything that is based on § 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG)
Remedies available to 3rd parties 1 A 3rd party can assert civil claims IF they have suffered a damage caused by a punishable act.
3rd party rights in proceedings 0 3rd parties are not entitled to request a 2nd phase investigation or challenge decisions of the court and have no access to evidence.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 § 42a(1) says if the companies made a certain combined income in the previous year, they must apply to the cartel court.
Pre-merger 0
Post-merger 1 §42a(5) says that the Cartel Court shall determine whether the concentration WAS implemented in a prohibited manner (sounds like post…)
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 §42b(2)(2) The Cartel Court shall prohibit the concentration if it will strengthen the market dominating position.
Restriction of competition 0


Public interest (ProD) 1 The effect on the national economy and public interest is investigated when deciding whether to grant an exception (see §42b(3)).
Public Interest (ProAuthority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits access 1 § 35(1)(2) prohibits the restriction of production, sales, or development to the detriment of the consumer.
Abusive acts 1 § 35(1) lists several punishable abusive acts.
Price Setting 1 § 35(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of unreasonable prices.
Discriminatory pricing 1 § 35(1)(3) identifies as abuse the placing of contractual partners at a competitive disadvantage by applying different terms for the provision of equivalent services.
Resale price maintenance 0
Obstacles to entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price fixing 1 § 10(3) identifying a restraint of competition with respect to prices (not per se illegal)
Tying 0
Market Division 1 § 23(1) per se prohibits arrangements under which the parties agree that they shall only market certain products.
Output restraint 1 § 23 (1)(b) does not cartels that require companies to sell products in specifically restricted quantities.
Market sharing 0
Eliminating competitors 1 Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1).
Collusive tendering/bid-rigging 0
Supply refusal 1 § 30 prohibits supply boycotts when they cause damage. Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1)(c).
Efficiency Defense 1 §23(3) allows cartels when they are justified with respect to the national economy.


References

  1. ↑ Austrian Competition Act, Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland, 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).
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