Hong Kong (2010): Difference between revisions
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'''Score = 18''' | |||
Governed by: Competition Bill, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Bill”). <ref> http://www.compag.gov.hk/reference/LegCo_Brief_on_Competition_Bill_with_Annex_2010_Eng.PDF</ref> | Governed by: Competition Bill, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Bill”). <ref> http://www.compag.gov.hk/reference/LegCo_Brief_on_Competition_Bill_with_Annex_2010_Eng.PDF</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | |||
|- | |||
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Scope | |||
| Extraterritoriality | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Remedies | |||
| Fines | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 91 and Section 168. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Prison Sentences | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Divestitures | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Private Enforcement | |||
| 3rd Party Initiation | |||
| 1 | |||
| Third parties may bring either "follow-on" actions or "stand-alone" actions. Sections 108-113. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | |||
| 1 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | |||
| 1 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Notification | |||
| Voluntary | |||
| 0 | |||
| Hong Kong has laws specific to the telecom industry allowing voluntary merger notification.<ref>[New merger control regime for Hong Kong telecoms sector http://www.freshfields.com/sector/comms-media/publications/pdfs/6164.pdf</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Mandatory | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Pre-merger | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Post-merger | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Assessment | |||
| Dominance | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Restriction of Competition | |||
| 1 | |||
| Schedule 7, section 3 prohibits mergers substantially lessening competition. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | |||
| 1 | |||
| Schedule 7, section 3 considers international competition, and the nature and extent of change and innovation in the market. See also, schedule 7, section 9. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Other | |||
| 1 | |||
| Schedule 7, section 9. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency | |||
| 1 | |||
| Schedule 7, section 8 allows an otherwise impermissible merger if it will bring economic efficiency outweight anticompetitive effect of the merger. | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Dominance | |||
| Limits Access | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 21 prevents a dominant undertaking from engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong Kong. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Abusive Acts | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 21(1): "An undertaking that has a substantial degree of market power in a market must not abuse that power by engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong | |||
Kong" | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Price Setting | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 21(2)(b) prohibits a dominant firm from "limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers" | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Discriminatory Pricing | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Predatory Pricing | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 21(2)(a) prohibits "predatory behaviour towards competitors". | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Resale Price Maintenance | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Obstacles to Entry | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 6 and 21 together prevents actions that purports to prevent, restrict or distort comeptition. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 0 | |||
| Schedule 1, section 1 excludes Agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency from the first conduct rule, section 6. However, this exclusion does not apply to the second conduct rule involving undertakings with substantial degree | |||
of market power. | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | |||
| Price Fixing | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 6(2)(a) says price fixing is illegal when it restricts competition. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Tying | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Division | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Output Restraint | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 6(2)(b) prohibits undertakings from limiting or controlling "production, markets, technical development or investment" | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Sharing | |||
| 1 | |||
| Section 6(2)(c) prohibits sharing of markets or sources of supply. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | |||
| 1 | |||
| Illegal if such an act's object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | |||
| 0 | |||
| No specific provision exists, but section 6 can be read to include such act as long as its object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| 0 | |||
| No specific provision exists, but section 6 can be read to include such act as long as its object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 1 | |||
| Schedule 1, section 1 excludes Agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency from the first conduct rule, section 6. | |||
|} | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
Revision as of 18:27, 30 September 2010
Score = 18
Governed by: Competition Bill, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Bill”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Section 91 and Section 168. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Third parties may bring either "follow-on" actions or "stand-alone" actions. Sections 108-113. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | Hong Kong has laws specific to the telecom industry allowing voluntary merger notification.[2] |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Schedule 7, section 3 prohibits mergers substantially lessening competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Schedule 7, section 3 considers international competition, and the nature and extent of change and innovation in the market. See also, schedule 7, section 9. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | Schedule 7, section 9. | |
| Efficiency | 1 | Schedule 7, section 8 allows an otherwise impermissible merger if it will bring economic efficiency outweight anticompetitive effect of the merger. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Section 21 prevents a dominant undertaking from engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong Kong. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Section 21(1): "An undertaking that has a substantial degree of market power in a market must not abuse that power by engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong
Kong" | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Section 21(2)(b) prohibits a dominant firm from "limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers" | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 0 | ||
| Predatory Pricing | 1 | Section 21(2)(a) prohibits "predatory behaviour towards competitors". | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Section 6 and 21 together prevents actions that purports to prevent, restrict or distort comeptition. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | Schedule 1, section 1 excludes Agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency from the first conduct rule, section 6. However, this exclusion does not apply to the second conduct rule involving undertakings with substantial degree
of market power. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Section 6(2)(a) says price fixing is illegal when it restricts competition. |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Section 6(2)(b) prohibits undertakings from limiting or controlling "production, markets, technical development or investment" | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Section 6(2)(c) prohibits sharing of markets or sources of supply. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Illegal if such an act's object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | No specific provision exists, but section 6 can be read to include such act as long as its object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | No specific provision exists, but section 6 can be read to include such act as long as its object or effect is to "prevent, restrict or distort competition". | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Schedule 1, section 1 excludes Agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency from the first conduct rule, section 6. |
References
- ↑ http://www.compag.gov.hk/reference/LegCo_Brief_on_Competition_Bill_with_Annex_2010_Eng.PDF
- ↑ [New merger control regime for Hong Kong telecoms sector http://www.freshfields.com/sector/comms-media/publications/pdfs/6164.pdf