Malawi (1998): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 26''' ''Governed by:'' Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998. <ref>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website, http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpol... |
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''Governed by:'' Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998. | ''Governed by:'' Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998. | ||
<ref>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website, http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/malawi.pdf</ref> | <ref>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website, http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/malawi.pdf</ref><ref>http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Malawi/1doc.pdf</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
Revision as of 15:25, 12 July 2007
Score = 26
Governed by: Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998. [1][2]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Sec. 2(5) extends scope to persons outside Malawi |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Sec. 51 provides for fines |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Sec. 51 provides for imprisonment | |
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Sec. 52 allows for 3rd party civil suits |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Sec. 52 allows for 3rd party damage recovery | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Sec. 35(1) requires authority from the commission | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Sec. 35(2) declares mergers invalid without authority | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Sec. 38(1)(a) considers ability to manipulate market |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Sec. 38(1)(a) considers whether merger will reduce competition | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Sec. 38(1)(b) mentions several possible public interest factors that could benefit D | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 1 | Sec. 38(2) considers the benefit to Malawi | |
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Sec. 38(1)(b)(i) allows for the efficiency defense | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 32(2) prohibits limiting access to markets |
| Abusive Acts | 0 | ||
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 32(2)(a) prohibits predatory pricing | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Sec. 32(2)(b) prohibits discriminatory pricing | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Sec. 32(2)(f) prohibits resale price maintenance | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Sec. 41(1)(b) prohibits using dominance to prevent entry | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Sec. 32(2)(g) prohibits price fixing |
| Tying | 1 | Sec. 32(2)(c),(d) prohibit tying | |
| Market Division | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(c) prohibits market allocation agreements | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(f) prohibits output restraint | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(c),(g) prohibit market sharing | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(a) prohibits eliminating competition | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(b) prohibits collusive tendering and bid-rigging | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Sec. 33(3)(f) prohibits supply refusal | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 |
References
- ↑ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website, http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/malawi.pdf
- ↑ http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Malawi/1doc.pdf