Malta (January 1, 2003): Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 107: | Line 107: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(4) allows a defense for mergers that are likely to bring about gains in efficiency. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
Revision as of 20:58, 15 July 2007
Score = 18
Governed by: Chapter 379 Competition Act of 1 February 1995, last amended III. 2004 125 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”) and Subsidiary Legislation 379.08 Control of Concentrations Regulations of 1st January 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “Concentration Reg”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3 defines “relevant market” as localities located either inside or outside Malta. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 21 provides guidelines for fining. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 13 allows the commission to force structural remedies on a firm. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 12(1) says that investigations can be initiated by a reasonable allegation in writing by a 3rd party. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 5(1) of the Concentration Reg says that notification must occur prior to implementation. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 5(1) of the Concentration Reg says that notification must occur prior to implementation. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 4(2)(d) of the Concentration Reg lists the market positions of the undertakings as a factor in merger assessment. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 4(2)(a) of the Concentration Reg says that the Director must make a determination based on the need to maintain effective competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 4(4) allows a defense for mergers that are likely to bring about gains in efficiency. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 9(2)(c) prohibits limiting production or markets. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 9(1) prohibits abusive acts by dominant undertakings. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 9(2)(a) prohibits price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 9(2)(e) prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 9(2)(d) prohibits eliminating competitors. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 5(1)(a) prohibits price fixing. Article 5(1)(b) prohibits discriminatory pricing. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 5(1)(e) | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 5(1)(b) prohibits limiting and controlling production. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 5(1)(c) prohibits market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 5(3) gives an exemption to the Article 5(1) prohibitions for agreements which contribute towards the objective of improving production or distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress |
References
- ↑ Malta Ministry for Competitiveness and Communications website, http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_10/chapt379.pdf; http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/Legislation/English/SubLeg/379/08.pdf.