User talk:JWSchneider

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Zambia 1994 - Limits access

Does this count?

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1), enterprises shall refrain from the following acts or behaviour if through abuse or acquisition of a dominant position of market power, they limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, or have or are likely to have adverse effect on trade or the economy in general

--JWSchneider 15:48, 23 July 2007 (EDT)

Zambia 1994 - Merger defenses

How do we categorize this?

Other public interest considerations may include: the equitable distribution of wealth; prevention of unemployment, need to implement an industrial police; to indigenise national economics.

--JWSchneider 16:15, 23 July 2007 (EDT)


Achal: Public interest. (Pro-D) --JWSchneider 10:37, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Zambia 1994 - Merger assessment - Other - Business Failure

This is from a Zambian Competition Commission report (http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/Competition%20Rules%20in%20Zambia.PDF)

"The Commission, in some instances, 'will authorize a dominant undertaking to acquired a failing competitor' if there is cause that there will be more efficient use of resources which may be achieved through the merger or acquisition, and consequently convey substantial benefits to the community."

--JWSchneider 16:19, 23 July 2007 (EDT)


Hylton: Count this as business failure. --JWSchneider 10:36, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Zimbabwe 2001 - Predatory Pricing

Found Predatory Pricing prohibition under Amendment 14 of 2001 amendments to the Competition Act of 1996

--JWSchneider 16:33, 23 July 2007 (EDT)

Netherlands 1999 - Merger assessment - Efficiency

Does this count?

Article 47(1) - Our Minister may, after the director general has refused a licence for the realisation of a concentration, decide in response to a request to that effect that the licence shall be granted if, in the Minister's view, this is necessary for serious reasons in the general interest, which outweigh the expected restriction of competition.

--JWSchneider 12:00, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Bosnia 2005 - Merger assessment - public interest (pro-authority) / other

This was marked as pro-authority AND other, but I have my doubts. Doesn't look like either qualifies. I see no business failure, for example.

Article 17 Appraisal of Concentrations In making the assessment of intended concentration, the Council of Competition shall analyze the positive and negative effects, or whether that concentration creates or strengthens dominant position which will result in the significant distortion of market competition, in particular:

  • a) the structure of the relevant market;
  • b) the effects of the concentration concerned on other actual and potential competitors;
  • c) the market position of parties in competition, their market shares, economic and financial power;
  • d) alternatives available to suppliers and users;
  • e) economic, legal and other barriers to entry to the market;
  • f) level of internal and international competitiveness of the parties to concentration;
  • g) supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and/or services;
  • h) the trends of technical and economic progress;
  • i) consumers` interests.

--JWSchneider 16:05, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Bosnia 2005 - RTP - Supply refusal

See it anywhere? The previous coder found it in this article.

Article 4 Agreements (1) There shall be prohibited all agreements, contracts, single provision of agreements or contracts, concerted practices, explicit and tacit agreements between the undertakings, as well as decisions by associations of undertakings (hereinafter: agreements) the object or effect of which is to prevent, restrict or distort market competition in the relevant market, and in particular those which:

  • a) directly or indirectly fix purchase and selling prices or any other trading conditions;
  • b) limit or control the production, markets, technical development or investment;
  • c) share markets or sources of supply;
  • d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other undertakings, thereby placing them at a

competitive disadvantage;

  • e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations

which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

--JWSchneider 16:15, 24 July 2007 (EDT)