User talk:JWSchneider
RTP - Efficiency Defense.
I think the following counts as an efficiency defense to RTP.
6(3) - "3. In exceptional cases, agreements (coordinated actions) between economic entities as stipulated by the present Article, excluding those listed in clause 1 of the present Article, may be considered legally valid by anti-monopoly body in compliance with the procedure sets up by the President of the Republic of Belarus, or by any other state body or court authorized by the President, provided the economic entities prove that economic effect of their actions, including social and economic sectors, will exceed negative consequences for the given commodity market or the Republic of Belarus as a whole, and competition must only be restricted to the extent wherein the above restrictions are inevitable for the achievement of the given economic effect, or directly stipulated by legislative acts adopted (issued) in according with the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus."
--JWSchneider 10:38, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
I agree, looks like an efficiency defense.
--AchalOza 11:04, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
Merger Efficiency Defense
Looks like a merger efficiency defense to me (see 28(2))
Authorisation for Concentration
Article 28. (1) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission shall authorise the concentration provided that the latter does not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position that would significantly impede effective competition on the market concerned. (2) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission may authorise a concentration which, although creating or strengthening a dominant position, aims at modernisation of production or of the economy as a whole, improvement of the market structures, attraction of investments, creation of new jobs, better satisfying of the interests of the consumers, and as a whole outweighs the negative impact on competition on the market concerned. (3) (Amended, SG No. 9/2003) The Commission may include in the authorisation referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) additional restrictive requirements which are directly related to the implementation of the concentration and are needed for the preservation of the effective competition or the overall positive impact on the market concerned.
--JWSchneider 11:08, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
Constitution
Can't translate the full document
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/consboliv2005.html
Remedies/Fines
Looks like Articles 23 to 27 discuss various fines
CHAPTER III PENALTIES Article 23. The following antitrust penalties shall apply: I - for companies: a fine from one to thirty percent of the gross pretax revenue thereof as of the latest financial year, which fine shall by no means be lower than the advantage obtained from the underlying violation, if assessable; II - for managers directly or indirectly liable to their company's violation: a fine from ten to fifty percent of the fine imposed on said company, which shall be personally and exclusively imposed on the manager; and III - in the case of other individuals and other public or private legal entities, as well as any de facto or de jure associations of entities or persons, even temporary ones, with or without legal identity, that do not engage in business activities, when it is not feasible to use the gross sales value, the fine will be 6,000 (six thousand) to 6,000,000 (six million) UFIR or any other index replacing it. Sole Paragraph. Fines imposed on recurring violations shall be doubled. Article 24. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article, the fines listed below may be individually or cumulatively imposed on violations, whenever the severity of the facts or the public interest so requires: I - at the violator's expense, half-page publication of the summary sentence in a court-appointed newspaper for two consecutive days, from one to three consecutive weeks; II. - ineligibility for official financing or participation in bidding processes involving purchases, sales, works, services or utility concessions with the federal, state, municipal and the Federal District authorities and related entities, for a period equal to or exceeding five years; III. - annotation of the violator on the Brazilian Consumer Protection List; IV - recommendation that the proper public agencies: (a) grant compulsory licenses for patents held by the violator; and (b) deny the violator installment payment of federal overdue debts, or order total or partial cancellation of tax incentives or public subsidies; V - the company's spin-off, transfer of corporate control, sale of assets, partial discontinuance of activities, or any other antitrust measure required for such purposes. Article 25. If any acts or situations detrimental to the economic order are not discontinued after a CADE Board decision to this effect, or in the event preventive measures or any cease-and-desist commitment set forth herein are not complied with, a daily fine equal to or higher than 5,000 (five thousand) Fiscal Reference Units — UFIR or replacing index shall apply, which fine may be increased as many as twenty times in accordance with the severity of the violation and the violator's economic status. Article 26. In the event any data or documents requested by CADE, SDE, SEAE or other public entity acting under this Law are unreasonably denied, concealed, tampered with or delayed, this shall constitute a violation subject to a daily fine of 5,000 (five thousand) UFIR, which fine may be increased up to twentyfold in keeping with the violator's economic status. Article 27. The penalties provided for in this Law shall apply with due regard for: I - the severity of the violation; II - the violator's good faith; III - the advantages obtained or envisaged by the violator; IV - actual or threatened occurrence of the violation; V - the extent of damages or threatened damages to open competition, the Brazilian economy, consumers, or third parties; VI - the adverse economic effects on the market; VII - the violator's economic status; VIII - recurrences.