Latvia (Jan 1, 1998)
Score = 10
Governed by: Competition Law of June 18, 1997, came into force January 1 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”) [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | The Competition Council can impose fines on firms that violate the Act. [2] |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | The Competition Council has initiated investigations based on third party complaints. [3] |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 1 | Article 19 of the Act contains a merger notification requirement, though it is unclear whether it is voluntary or mandatory. [4] |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 1 | Article 19 of the Act requires merger notification after the merger has taken effect.[5] | |
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | In assessing a merger, the Competition Council considers the resulting "market power" of the merging intentities. [6] |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | In assessing the validity of a merger, the Competition Council considers it in "regard to the development
and preservation of competition." [7] | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | The Competition Council will consider the effect of an agreement on its ability to increase exports and its effect on "customers’ welfare."[8] | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | In assessing a merger, the Competition Council considers "possible benefits or losses for consumers and society"[9] | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | The Act prohibits abuse of a dominant position. [10] | |
| Price Setting | 0 | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | 0 | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | In evaluating draft legislation, the Competition Council looked down on dominant firms that create barriers to market entry. [11]. Furthermore, in Article 1.2, in defining a dominant position, the Act consider whether a firm can "significantly prevent, restrict or distort competition." [12] | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 0 | |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | The Act forbids an agreement that limits flow of services to the market[13] | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | In evaluating draft legislation, the Competition Council looked negatively upon market sharing. [14] | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 15 of The Act prohibits agreements that restrict competition.[15] | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 0 |
References
- ↑ Actual statute could not be found. Substance of law found using an OECD report as secondary sources: OECD Global Forum on Competition, Sept 21 2001, available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/ENGDIRCORPLOOK/NT00004E56/$FILE/JT00113087.PDF (hereinafter referred to as "OECD")
- ↑ OECD at 9
- ↑ OECD at 4
- ↑ OECD at 2, 9
- ↑ OECD at 9
- ↑ OECD at 10, 12
- ↑ OECD at 10
- ↑ OECD at 10
- ↑ OECD at 10
- ↑ OECD at 2
- ↑ OECD at 4
- ↑ OECD at 5
- ↑ OECD at 15
- ↑ OECD at 3
- ↑ OECD at 2, 6, 8