Austria (January 1, 2000)
Score = 20
Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as “Cartel Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | § 6(1) of the Cartel Act applies to behavior in a foreign country in so far as it affects the domestic market. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | § 129-133 provide for violations of the Cartel Act to be sanctioned with fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | § 129(1) also provides for imprisonment for up to 3 years in certain cases. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | §35(2) allows divestures in certain situations. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | A 3rd party can bring a claim against anything that is based on § 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG) |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | A 3rd party can assert civil claims IF they have suffered a damage caused by a punishable act. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | 3rd parties are not entitled to request a 2nd phase investigation or challenge decisions of the court and have no access to evidence. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | § 42a(1) says if the companies made a certain combined income in the previous year, they must apply to the cartel court. | |
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 1 | §42a(5) says that the Cartel Court shall determine whether the concentration WAS implemented in a prohibited manner (sounds like post…) | |
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | §42b(2)(2) The Cartel Court shall prohibit the concentration if it will strengthen the market dominating position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 |
| |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | The effect on the national economy and public interest is investigated when deciding whether to grant an exception (see §42b(3)) | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | § 35(1)(2) prohibits the restriction of production, sales, or development to the detriment of the consumer. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | § 35(1) lists several punishable abusive acts. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | § 35(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of unreasonable prices. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | § 35(1)(3) identifies as abuse the placing of contractual partners at a competitive disadvantage by applying different terms for the provision of equivalent services. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | § 10(3) identifying a restraint of competition with respect to prices (not per se illegal) |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | § 23(1) per se prohibits arrangements under which the parties agree that they shall only market certain products. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | § 23 (1)(b) does not cartels that require companies to sell products in specifically restricted quantities. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1). | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | § 30 prohibits supply boycotts when they cause damage. Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1)(c). | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §23(3) allows cartels when they are justified with respect to the national economy. |
References
- ↑ Austrian Competition Act, Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland, 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).