France, 1986
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1986 saw the passage of a major competition law, Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986.[1] This replaced Ordinnance No. 45-1243 of June 30, 1945. 1986 also saw the repeal of Penal Code Art. 419 (after 176 years)[2].
Governed by: Ordinance no. 86-1243 of 1 December 1986.
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | The Ordinance applies to anything having a competition effect on the French market.[3] |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 13 and 14 provide for monetary sanctions for certain offenses. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Article 17 provides prison sentences for certain competition offenses. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | Art. 42 allows the Minister of the Economy to undo certain mergers.
| |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Any party who has an interest can commence an action before the courts by serving an assignation. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | The French Code of Criminal Procedure allows victims of crimes to recover in tort suits. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 1 | |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 1 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 38 requires that the companies’ market shares are examined when deciding whether the merger needs review. |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Art. 41 makes an exception for "National Champion" firms. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 8 prohibits abusive exploitation by a dominant enterprise. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 8 applies the restriction on price setting as established in Article 7 to dominant companies. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 8 bans discriminatory pricing by dominant companies. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Article 32 bans RPM when the distributor sets a minimum price (but not for setting a max price) | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 10(2) offers a defense for showing that the effect of the acts if they ensure economic progress. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 7(2) prohibits price fixing. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 8 prohibits tying arrangements. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 7(3) prohibits limiting or controlling production. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 7(1) prohibits agreements that limits access to the market or free exercise of competition by other enterprises. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 8 prohibits refusing to sell. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 10 exempts for Article 7 and 8 agreements that have the effect of ensuring economic progress. |
References
- ↑ The text of the statute is available in French Law, Constitution and Selective Legislation, George A. Bermann & Vivian G. Curran, 1998, section 5 (last updated, 1994). The edition notes the legislative changes, and the 1994 changes do not affect the 1986 scoring.
- ↑ in Provision 57 of the statute
- ↑ CA Paris, 1ère Ch. sect. conc., 15 September 1993, Sté. Brassler et Ass.: BOCCRF 8 April 1994.