Italy (August 4, 2006)
Score =
Governed by:
Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of 13 October 1990)[1]
Law no. 57 of March 5th, 2001 (Section 11) - Provisions governing the opening and regulation of markets (Official Gazzette no. 66 of 20 March 2001)[2]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Competition Authority. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.
Law No. 57, Section 11(3-bis) permits the Competition Authority to investigate complaints filed by third parties regarding abuses of economic dependence that may affect competition or a free market. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. If a merger will result in market dominance, it may not be approved, or the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.[3] |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 8(2) states that undertakings which operate by law for the general economic interest, or in a state-authorized monopoly, are exempt from the anti-competition measures of this law, but only if that is necessary for the provision of those services. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 1 | Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement. | |
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(a) prohibits use of abuse of a dominant position to directly or indirectly fix or impose prices. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position to limit or restrict market access. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 3, prohibits business entities from abusing a dominant position in a market, but not necessarily from occupying such a position. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. |
| Tying | 1 | Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(e) prohibits tying. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Market division is not mentioned specifically in the Italian Competition law, however, one of the goals of the law is to prevent any secret cartels or agreements that restrict or distort competition. The Competition Authority's website mentions that market division is one of the types of agreements the law is meant to prevent.[4] | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(c) forbids anti-competitive agreements to share markets or sources of supplies. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically. The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including directly or indirectly fixing purchasing or selling prices or other contractual conditions (Section 2(2)(a)). | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including restricting production, market outlets or market access (Section 2(2)(b)). | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Law no. 287, Section 4, allows some anti-competitive agreements to be approved for limited times if they are absolutely necessary to improve market supply, with substantial benefits for consumers. |