User talk:JWSchneider

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Netherlands 1999 - Merger assessment - Efficiency

Does this count?

Article 47(1) - Our Minister may, after the director general has refused a licence for the realisation of a concentration, decide in response to a request to that effect that the licence shall be granted if, in the Minister's view, this is necessary for serious reasons in the general interest, which outweigh the expected restriction of competition.

--JWSchneider 12:00, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Hylton: Public interest. --JWSchneider 10:18, 25 July 2007 (EDT)

Bosnia 2005 - Merger assessment - public interest (pro-authority) / other

This was marked as pro-authority AND other, but I have my doubts. Doesn't look like either qualifies. I see no business failure, for example.

Article 17 Appraisal of Concentrations In making the assessment of intended concentration, the Council of Competition shall analyze the positive and negative effects, or whether that concentration creates or strengthens dominant position which will result in the significant distortion of market competition, in particular:

  • a) the structure of the relevant market;
  • b) the effects of the concentration concerned on other actual and potential competitors;
  • c) the market position of parties in competition, their market shares, economic and financial power;
  • d) alternatives available to suppliers and users;
  • e) economic, legal and other barriers to entry to the market;
  • f) level of internal and international competitiveness of the parties to concentration;
  • g) supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and/or services;
  • h) the trends of technical and economic progress;
  • i) consumers` interests.

--JWSchneider 16:05, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

Bosnia 2005 - RTP - Supply refusal

See it anywhere? The previous coder found it in this article.

Article 4 Agreements (1) There shall be prohibited all agreements, contracts, single provision of agreements or contracts, concerted practices, explicit and tacit agreements between the undertakings, as well as decisions by associations of undertakings (hereinafter: agreements) the object or effect of which is to prevent, restrict or distort market competition in the relevant market, and in particular those which:

  • a) directly or indirectly fix purchase and selling prices or any other trading conditions;
  • b) limit or control the production, markets, technical development or investment;
  • c) share markets or sources of supply;
  • d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other undertakings, thereby placing them at a

competitive disadvantage;

  • e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations

which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

--JWSchneider 16:15, 24 July 2007 (EDT)


Hylton: This is output restraint, not supply refusal. --JWSchneider 10:24, 25 July 2007 (EDT)

Bosnia 2005 - Predatory Pricing

Found one

Act on Competition of 2005 is supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006. Article 9(c) of this by-law prohibits "fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors."

--JWSchneider 16:19, 24 July 2007 (EDT)