Belgium/EU, 2006

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Governed by:

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article 2 §1 of the statute applies to practices that affect the Belgian market.
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 63 provides for fines for competition violations, and additional fines for violations that persist after the violators are ordered to stop.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Article 59 §7 of the statute states that anticompetitive mergers may be dissolved.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Article 48 §5 says that the Council shall hear the complainant's testimony for competition violations, if the complainant wishes to testify. Article 57 §2 allows interested third parties to be heard in merger hearings.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 8 §1 says the concentrations involving large companies shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.
Pre-merger 2 Articles 8 §1 and 9 §1 says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 8 §2(2) states that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 8 §2(1) state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.


Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 8 Article 8 §6 and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 1 Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.