Russia (2002)
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Score = 21
Governed by: Law of the RSFRF No. 948-1 on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodities Markets of 22 March 1991 (as Amended JUNE 24, 1992, МAY 25, 1995, МАY 6, 1998, January 2, 2000,December 30, 2001, march 21 and October 9, 2002). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 of the statute extends its reach to extraterritorial actions that affect competition in the Russian Market. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 12(2) authorizes fines. Article 23.1 allows the state to collect the income gained through monopolistic activities. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Articles 12 and 19 authorize divestitures of monopolies. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 27(2) allows third parties to initiate proceedings. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 26 provides for civil recovery by parties injured by competition violations. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 17(3) states that strengthening of a dominant position is a factor against allowing a merger. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 17(3) states that restriction of competition is a factor against allowing a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the public benefit outweighs the competitive loss. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the socio economic benefit exceeds the damage to competition. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 5(1) bans limiting access or supply. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 5 bans abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 5 bans price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 5 bans discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 5 bans creating obstacles to entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 5 permits certain otherwise impermissible activities when the socio-economic benefit is strong enough. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 6 bans price fixing. |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | Article 6 bans market division. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 6(2) bans eliminating competitors. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 6 bans bid rigging. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 6(1) bans supply refusal | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 6(4) permits otherwise impermissible activity if the socio-economic benefit outweighs the harm from the activity. |
References
- ↑ Statute from the International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerrussianlaw2003.pdf